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An fimproved fitfinerary recordfing protocol for
securfing dfistrfibuted archfitectures based on
mobfile agents
Gufilaume Aléea, Samuel Pfierea,∗, Roch H. Glfithoband Abdelmorhfit El Rhazfia
aMobfile Computfing and Networkfing Research Laboratory(Larfim), Canada
bErficsson Research Canada, Canada
Abstract.Thfis paper proposes an fimproved fitfinerary recordfing protocol for securfing dfistrfibuted archfitectures based on mobfile
agents. The behavfior of each of the cooperatfing agents fis descrfibed, as wel as the decfisfion process establfishfing the fidentfitfies of
ofenders when an atack fis detected. Our protocol fis tested on a set of potentfial atacks and the results conffir our assumptfion
regardfing ofender desfignatfions and moments of detectfion. More precfisely, the performance evaluatfion shows that our protocol
detects the atack where there fis colaboratfion between a platform on the cooperatfing agents’ fitfinerary and another on the mobfile
agent’s fitfinerary. As a result, thfis protocol constfitutes a sufitable optfion for electronfic commerce applficatfions where securfity
concerns prevafil over cost factors.
Keywords: Mobfile agent, fitfinerary recordfing, dfistrfibuted archfitecture, securfity protocol, electronfic commerce, cooperatfing
agents
1. Introductfion
Wfide-area networks alow the desfign of finterestfing shared applficatfions that permfit constant access to
resources and finformatfion avafilable on the Internet. However, programmfing these applficatfions remafins
chalengfing: the mafin problem fis due to the fact that the statfic features of the clfient-server archfitecture
are not wel adapted to the dynamfic aspects and dfiversfity of the systems that are avafilable on the Internet.
An alternatfive could be to replace the finteractfions between both entfitfies by the mobfilfity of an agent that
mfigrates to hosts provfidfing finterestfing data. Sfince the agents execute wfithfin the envfironment provfided by
the remote host, securfity concerns are paramount, especfialy for applficatfions lfike electronfic commerce.
The problem we are addressfing fis that of verfifyfing and recordfing the fidentfitfies of the host platforms
whfich have executed the agent. Thfis problem fis hard to solve wfith only one agent as malficfious hosts can
alter the agent’s data. One possfible solutfion to detect these atacks would be to use co-operatfing agents
fin a protocol to record and verfify the fitfinerarfies.
Greenberg et al. [11] deffin the word agent as an autonomous applficatfion whfich has one or several
purposes or a set of capabfilfitfies and could, fif need be, colaborate or communficate wfith other agents
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or users. An agent is considered mobile when it can be transported from one machine to another on a
network [12]. However, a mobile agent cannot transport itself: it is the executing platform that sends it
to another platform through the network. The set of platforms where the agent is executed is called the
agent itinerary.
A platform is concurrently a client and a server that allows the execution of an agent. The platform
receives and sends the agent. It must be installed on all hosts where the agent stops. Platform protection]
techniques are required to shield the execution environment and platform resources against several types
of attacks from a mobile agent. On the other hand, agent protection techniques must be used to protect
the agent’s code and data from interference by malicious hosts [6,7,9,14,17].
Platforms are susceptible to a variety of possible agent attacks. A hostile agent can attempt to access
resources without the platform authorization, it may consume too many resources (e.g. CPU or disk
space) or disguise itself as another agent. Researchers have developed several techniques in order to
protect the platform. Most of these are based on conventional protection approaches but there are some
techniques that use new concepts, such as codes with proofs, which consists of asserting certain features
of the agent’s code (such as memory protection) and supplying a proof of these features. When an agent
arrives on a new platform, the latter verifie the compatibility of the proof and the agent’s code [2,3,8].
Platform attacks against the agent are even more critical since the platform has access to an agent’s
components and can modify them in the absence of attack detection or prevention techniques. An
attack [13] may take various shapes: a change that modifie the behavior of an agent or alters the stored
results obtained from another platform, as well as the denial of services when a platform requests a task
from an agent, namely when a platform refuses to send an agent to another platform. A simple yet
effective attack on a mobile agent aims at preventing the agent from migrating to competitors’ servers.
This particularly affects mobile agents with loose itineraries in comparison to agents whose itineraries
are define a priori [15]. The problem consists of verifying and recording the identities of the platforms,
which have executed the agent in order to secure the mobile agent’s route. It is crucial to detect or protect
the mobile agent against this type of attack in the fiel of e-commerce where the agent wants to visit all
of the competitors’ servers.
Roth [16] identifie fl ws in some cryptographic protocols that are targeted at protecting free-roaming
mobile agents, e.g. mobile agents that are free to choose their next hop dynamically based on data they
acquire during their execution. He found that some protocols succumbed to interleaving attacks which
are impersonation or other deception involving selective combination of information from one or more
previous or simultaneously ongoing protocol execution. He presented in [17] an approach which is
robust against interleaving attacks. He also introduced algorithms and data structures meant to protect
free-roaming mobile agents against attacks on data integrity and confidentialit .
In [4], Westhoff et al. propose a method to protect agent routes against attacks performed by a single
platform as well as attacks conducted by collusions of cooperating malicious platforms. They defin the
route protection as the guarantee that “none of the visited stations can manipulate the route in a malicious
ways, nor can they get an overview of the other sites the agent’s owner is contacting”. They suppose
that the agent route is initially provided by the platform of origin and that it can be extended by a visited
site. The information related to a mobile agent’s route is hidden in such a way that only the mobile
agent’s platform of origin knows all the platforms to be visited. The platform of origin can be sure that
all chosen platforms have been visited. Actually, this method differs from our method as we consider
the agent route to be totally dynamic (i.e., the route is not fi ed by the platform of origin).
Schneider [5] combines the replication and the voting concepts to ensure the proper functioning of the
agent. The idea is that instead of having a computation performed solely by the mobile agent, multiple
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copies are used to perform the same computation and the result is obtained by a result consensus from all
of the platforms. If a malicious platform attacked the mobile agent, the existence of several clones would
ensure the correct end result. The main advantage of this method is that it addresses the system failure.
Its drawbacks is that additional resources are needed for agent replications. The method proposed in this
paper also uses the concepts of replication to ensure security i.e. a cooperating agent executes partially
the same code as the one executed by the mobile agent.
This paper proposes a security mechanism inspired by Roth [15] to protect mobile agents’ itineraries
against a set of potential attacks from offender platforms in an electronic commerce context. Section 2
summarizes Roth’s protocol. Section 3 proposes a new itinerary recording protocol (based on Roth’s
protocol) and assesses the effectiveness of this new protocol through the types of attacks it detects.
Section 4 presents implementation details and results.
2. Summary and background of Roth’s protocol
Itinerary recording is carried out according to a protocol whose purpose is to record and verify the
itinerary of a mobile agent with a cooperating agent, in an autonomous fashion, without permanently
connecting a trusted platform to the network. The two agents’ owner platform connects to the network
to send the agents to their firs platforms, and then it disconnects itself until both agents return. As
the itinerary is not pre-established, the mobile agent moves progressively while accomplishing its tasks
and it chooses its next destinations during its execution on different platforms. The purpose of Roth’s
protocol is to record and verify the mobile agent’s itinerary.
2.1. Definition and main assumptions
Let H be the set of available platforms on a network. R is a subset of H × H such as (h i, hj)
∈ R ⇔ hi and hj collaborate in order to attack the agent. Ha and Hb are non-void subsets of H with
(Ha ×Hb)∩R = Ø. These two subsets are considered non-collaborating sets of platforms. Two agents,
a and b, are considered cooperating agents, when the itinerary of agent a contains only H a platforms and
agent b’s itinerary has only Hb platforms. ha and hb are current execution environments for agents a and
b. Basically, agent a could be attacked by platform ha that executes it, but ha could not directly attack
cooperating agent b. Moreover, platform hb will not collaborate with ha for this purpose. However, it is
possible that two platforms on agent a’s itinerary collaborate to attack it.
Roth [14] justifie this choice by stating that it is as unrealistic to state that “all platforms are hostile
and ready to collaborate with each other to attack the agent” as to claim that “all platforms could be
securely used”. According to Roth, it is more realistic to state that:
– At a given moment in the life of an agent, a certain percentage of platforms could be considered
dangerous;
– All dangerous platforms are not necessarily ready to collaborate with other platforms to attack an
agent.
Roth [14] adds the following three assumptions to implement the concept of cooperating agents:
– The transport of agents from one platform to another is carried out through an authenticated channel
(Assumption 1);
– The platforms supply authenticated communication channels to cooperating agents (Assumption 2);
– The agent has authenticated access to the identity of the remote platform with which it communicates,
the platform on which it is executed, and to the previous platform on which it was executed
(Assumption 3).
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Definition:  Let hi  Ha be the platforms visited by agent a and let id(hi) be the identity of 
platform hi. Let previ be the identity of the last platform where agent a has been executed. 
Finally let nexti  be the identity of the next platform where the agent would like to go after 
platform hi. The agent starts from platform h0. Thus, if the agent moves a total of n times, 
we must obtain h0 = hn, since agent a returns to the platform of origin. 
 
Initialization: Let h0 be the platform of origin of agents a and b. h0 must be a trustworthy 
platform for agents a and b. Each agent is sent to its first platform (next0) through an 
authenticated communication channel (Assumption 1). 
 
Step i, i  {1,…,n}: 
Agent a sends a message to agent b containing nexti and  previ  through an 
authenticated channel (Assumption 2). Thus, agent b learns id(hi) (Assumption 3) and 
verifies that 
id(hi) = nexti – 1 and previ = id (hi–1)  
If this is the case, b records nexti in agent a’s itinerary. 
Fig. 1. Itinerary recording protocol.
2.2. Roth’s protocol
Let a and b be two cooperating agents, Ha and Hb two non-collaborating platform subsets of H . Each
agent must return to its platform of origin at the end of its task. Agent b records and verifie the itinerary
of its cooperating agent a, according to the protocol described in Fig. 1.
The need for a cooperating agent is mainly justifie by the fact that a malicious platform might modify
the data held by an agent executing on that platform. Indeed, it could be argued that, if one supposes
that the third assumption is valid, it is sufficien that the agent keeps the authenticated identity of each
platform where it was executed. It could be supposed that it makes the same verification as agent b
in Roth’s protocol. However, this solution is not secure. The following is a contrary example with an
undetected attack. Host hi attacks the agent by sending it to host hf , although the agent is supposed to
go to platform hi+1. The identity of host hf is added to the itinerary record, then host hf replaces the
agent on its route by sending it to hi+1, which is supposed to be honest. On hi+1, the agent verifie the
identity of the platform that sent it, which appears correct, since hf did not modify the itinerary record.
On step j > i + 1, host hj , which is allied with attacking platforms hi and hf , modifie the itinerary
record to remove the record of execution on host hf . When the agent returns to its owner’s platform, its
itinerary record appears correct although there are no records of the execution on host h f .
3. Proposed new itinerary recording protocol
It should be noted that Roth’s protocol does not specify the manner by which agent b moves. In
our approach, we propose to move agent b every time agent a moves, i.e., when agent a contacts b to
announce the identities of its next and previous execution platforms. Once this information is obtained,
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agent b moves to another platform and waits to communicate with agent a. We will specify the required
assumptions for our protocol, describe the possible attacks, and indicate the manner in which they will
be detected by the protocol. Finally, we will show the originality of our protocol in relation to Roth’s.
3.1. Assumptions
As stated above, agent b will move. There are two possibilities for agent b’s itinerary: it is either
pre-determined or not. We propose to fi the itinerary of agent b at the beginning of the protocol. The
advantage of this choice is that, with a fi ed itinerary, we simplify the protocol and increase the likelihood
of detecting the attack.
We suppose that agent a has a chronological list of platforms to be visited by agent b. We call this
list pf, pf [i] indicating the platforms visited by agent b, later called hbi. Since a movement from agent
a triggers the movement of agent b, the number of platforms visited by agent b must be identical to the
number of platforms visited by agent a. However, the number of hosts visited by agent a cannot be
predicted. To solve this problem, the number of platforms visited by agent a will be limited. This type
of estimate is possible when “looking for the best price for a product” type of applications, where we
know that the agent will visit a number of vendors, but we know neither the platforms (because a vendor
has several platforms) nor the order in which the visits will take place. Therefore, it is impossible to
establish an itinerary before the departure from the owner’s platform. Agent b’s itinerary consulted by
agent a must be protected from modifications This itinerary could, for example, be part of the agent’s
data and thus, with the agent’s code, could be protected from modifications This is possible with the
owner’s signature guaranteeing the integrity of the agent and publishing its identity for the benefi of the
platforms where the agents will eventually be executed.
We suppose that the set of platforms visited by agent a and the set of platforms visited by agent b are
disjoint. The order in which agent b visited the platforms is irrelevant. It is nevertheless important to
minimize the probability of an attack from a platform on agent b’s itinerary with a collaboration from
a platform on agent a’s itinerary. However, it is difficul to quantify this risk, since a’s itinerary is not
pre-determined. This is why agent b’s itinerary should be chosen randomly, from a list of platforms that
do not offer the services sought by agent a.
Figure 2 illustrates these assumptions using a collaboration example considered impossible in Roth’s
protocol, which becomes possible in the protocol we suggest. We use the same assumptions as Roth’s (cf.
Section 2.1). This figur shows the assumptions that we put forth concerning the platform collaboration
to perform an attack. In our assumption, the platforms in a’s itinerary and b’s itinerary can collude to
attack mobile agent a. It is important to note that Roth’ assumption stipulates that the platforms in a’s
itinerary and b’s itinerary cannot collude to attack mobile agent a. For example, on the left of the figure
the platforms hai and hbi+1 can collude to attack agent a.
The impossible collaboration between platforms in the itinerary of agent a and platforms in the itinerary
of agent b is simply an assumption put forth by Roth. Our protocol treats the case where this collaboration
is not supposed. Consequently, our protocol supposes a reduced number of assumptions compared to
Roth’s protocol and treats more realistic cases.
3.2. Itinerary recording protocol
Definitio
Let hai be the platform visited by agent a, id(hai) the identity of this platform, hbi the platform
visited by agent b and id(hbi) the identity of this platform. Let prevai be the identity of the last platform
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Fig. 2. Possible collaborations.
where agent a was executed. According to Assumption 3, the agent has access to this identity in an
authenticated manner. Finally, let nextai be the identity of the next platform that agent a would like to
visit after visiting platform hai. The agent begins its itinerary on platform ha0. Thus, if agent a moves
a total of n times, we obtain ha0 = han as the assumption stating that the agent finall returns to the
platform of origin.
Initialization
Let h0 be the platform of origin of both agents a and b. h0 must be a trusted platform for both agents
a and b. For agent a, nexta0 has the value of the firs platform where the agent will be executed. Each
agent is sent to its respective destination.
Step i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}
Agent b waits for communication from agent a. If agent a does not communicate after a certain period
of time, agent b would consider that agent a was kidnapped, and it would return to its owner’s platform.
The offender cannot be identifie with certainty: it could be either that platform hai−1 did not actually
send the agent, or that platform hai hindered communication.
Agent a attempts to communicate with agent b on platform hbi.
If agent b is not on this platform, it is due to the fact that the previous platform hbi−1 did not send it
and that platform hbi did not execute it, or it did not grant network access to agent b in order to receive
communication from agent a. Therefore, we cannot record nor verify agent a’s itinerary. In this case,
agent a returns to its platform of origin.
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b fis on h0 
fi := 1 
contfinue:= true 
whfile contfinue do 
wafit_communficatfion ( ) 
 fif (verfify_sfignature ( prevafi | nextafi , sfignhafi) = false 
or fid(hafi) = nextafi – 1 
    or prevafi = fid (hafi – 1)) then 
   mfigrate ( h0 ) 
    ffind_ofender() 
    contfinue: = false 
 else 
   record_fitfinerary ( prevafi, nextafi, sfignhafi (prevafi | nextafi), 
       sfignhbfi (prevafi | nextafi|sfignhafi)) 
  fif nextafi = h0 then 
 mfigrate ( h0 ) 
      contfinue: = false 
    else 
       fi : = fi + 1 
   mfigrate ( hbfi ) 
        end fif 




Ffig. 3. Algorfithm for agentb.
Otherwfise, agentasends agentbthe fidentfitfies ofnextafiandprevafi, sfigned by platformhafiand by
the authentficated channel,blearnsfid(hafi). It verfiffie the sfignature ofhafiand the folowfing equalfitfies:
fid(hafi)=nextafi−1and prevafi=fid(hafi−1)
If these equalfitfies are conffirmed agentbrecordsnextafi,prevafi,hafi’s sfignature, then requfires a
sfignature fromhbfi. We usesfignY(X)to desfignate the result of the cryptographfic sfignature of platform
Yon objectXand we use | to desfignate concatenatfion. Here fis a typfical entry from the fitfinerary record.
prevafi nextafi sfignhafi(nextafi| prevafi) sfignhbfi(prevafi| nextafi|sfignhafi)
Non-conffirme fidentfitfies findficate that an atack has occured. In thfis case, agentbreturns to fits owner’s
platform.
Agentaperforms fits task on the platform before mfigratfing to fits subsequent destfinatfion. Ffigures 3
and 4 descrfibe the algorfithms for agentsaandbrespectfively.
Stepn
When the agents return to thefir owner’s platform wfithout detectfing an atack, the owner verfiffie
whether the fitfinerary has been modfiffied For each entryfi∈{1,...,n}, fit verfiffie whether the sfignature
sfignhafi(prevafi|nextafi)fis valfid and thathafi=nextafi−1=prevafi+1. It repeats the operatfion for
sfignhbfi(prevafi| nextafi| sfignhafi). An finvalfid entry findficates the occurence of an atack on the agent’s
fitfinerary and the results are consfidered finvalfid. The ofender was not fidentfiffied
Once the fintegrfity of the fitfinerary record has been conffirmed the agent’s owner verfiffie whether agent
a’s fitfinerary was executed on the desfignated platforms. A negatfive outcome findficates an atack has
occured and messages exchanged betweenaandbhave been modfiffied
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a fis on h0 
fi := 1 
whfile hafi = h0 do 
 communficate to hbfi(prevafi, nextafi, sfignhafi (prevafi | nextafi)) 
 fif communficatfion_succeed ( ) = false then 
    mfigrate ( h0 ) 
 else 
    task ( ) 
     fi := fi +1 
    mfigrate ( hafi ) 
 end fif 
end whfile 
/
Ffig. 4. Algorfithm for agenta.
offender1: = person 
offender2: = person 
offender3: = person 
valfidfity: = true 
fi : = 1 
whfile (offender1 = person and fi < n +1 and valfidfity = true) do 
fif (verfify_sfignature ( prevafi | nextafi , sfignhafi) = true 
        and verfify_sfignature ( prevafi | nextafi | sfignhafi , sfignhbfi) = true) then 
 If fid(sfignhafi) = prevafi+1 then   
         offender1: = hafi 
        offender2: = hbfi+1 
 end fif 
 fif fid(sfignhafi) = nextafi–1 then  
          offender1: = hafi–1  
      offender2: = hbfi 
      offender3: = hbfi+1 
 end fif 
 fif (fid(sfignhafi) = prevafi+1 and fid(sfignhafi) = nextafi–1 
            and platform_conform(fid(sfignhafi) = false ) then 
       ofender1: = hafi–1 
 else  
           valfidfity: = false 
 end fif    
           fi : = fi + 1 




Ffig. 5. Algorfithm Stepn.
Ffigure 6 descrfibes the functfionffindoffender()executed by agentbwhen fit detects an atack before
stepn, whfile Ffig. 5 presents the algorfithm executed on stepnfin the absence of atack detectfion fin the
prevfious steps. When fidentfifyfing the ofender, the algorfithm does not consfider the man-fin-the-mfiddle
atack as the protocol supposes that the communficatfion channels between agentsaandbare authentficated
and secured (e.g., usfing SSL [3]).
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offender1: = person 
offender2: = person 
fif verfify_sfignature ( prevafi | nextafi , sfignhafi) = false then 
offender1: = hafi 
else  
    fif fid(hafi) = nextafi–1 then 
        offender1: = hafi–1 
 else 
     fif prevafi = fid (hafi –1) then  
               fif fid (sfignhafi–1 ) = nextafi–2 then 
                  offender1: = prevafi 
      offender2: = hafi–1 
     else 
             offender1: = hafi–2 
     offender2: = hbfi–1 
        end fif 
  end fif 






The protocol we propose functfions sfimfilarly to Roth’s protocol [15], fin that fit detects the same
atacks when we uphold Roth’s assumptfions, fi.e., fif we suppose there fis no colaboratfion. However,
wfith the weaker assumptfions that we stated, we obtafin fidentfical results at the level of detected atacks.
The possfibfilfitfies for colaboratfion between two hostshafiandhbjfal finto one of the four subsets:
fi<j−1,fi=j−1,fi=j, andfi>j. We wfil also consfider the case of colaboratfion among the three
hostshafi,hbfi+1andhbfi+2. The other atacks wfith thfis type of colaboratfion can be modeled as two
dfiferent atacks wfith colaboratfion betweena’s fitfinerary platform and agentb’s fitfinerary platform.
3.3.1. Atack wfith Colaboratfion betweenhafiandhbj, wfithfi<j−1
In thfis scenarfio, the platformshafiandhbj(fi<j−1)colude fin order to atack the mobfile agent by
modfifyfing fits fitfinerary. Let’s suppose that the mobfile agent decfides to mfigrate to platformh’ (refer to
Ffig. 7) whfile runnfing on platformhafi. Platformhafiatacks the mobfile agentaby sendfing fit to platform
hafi+1 and modfiffie the message sent by mobfile agentato the cooperatfing agentb(fi.e. replaces the
fidentfity of platformh’ by the fidentfity of platformhafi+1fin the varfiablenextafi). Wfith thfis modfifficatfion
co-operatfing agentbcannot detect the atack. However, fit wfil be detected by the platform of orfigfin upon
the agents’ return to fit because the platform of orfigfin wfil detect that agentafis executed on platform
hafi+1finstead ofh’. In order to prevent the platform of orfigfin from detectfing thfis atack, platformhafi
wfil ask platformhbjto modfify the entry corespondfing to platformhafi+1fin agenta’s fitfinerary.
Replacfing an entry fin the fitfinerary record fis fimpossfible, sfince thfis later resfists to the modfifficatfions An
entry fis sfimultaneously sfigned by platformhafiandhbfi. If platformhbjatempts to modfify an entry wfith
j>fi, fit could not create a valfid entry at the sfignature level as fit cannot fimfitate the sfignature of platform
hbfi. Therefore, fif fit modfiffie nextafi; the sfignature wfil be finvalfid and the atack wfil be detected when
sfignatures are checked. However, the platform of orfigfin cannot ffin the ofender. Ifhbficolaborates wfith
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Fig. 7. Attack with collaboration between hai and hbj (i < j − 1).
hbj to counterfeit its signature, the attack will, nevertheless, be detected upon the agent’s return, since
the correspondence between nextai and the identity of the platform that signed entry i + 1 is invalid.
If platform hbj (j > i) could create its own agents and collect suitable records from the correct
itinerary of agent a, it could replace the entry i. Consequently, the protocol cannot detect this scenario
of attack due to the fact that the information route recorded by agent b are not linked to a particular agent
instance.
3.3.2. Attack with collaboration between hai and hbi+1
If hai sends agent a to platform hai+1 with id(hai+1) = nextai, platform hbi+1 will receive id(hai+1),
prevai+1 and nextai+1 information, then verify the equality of id(hai+1) = nextai. However, unless
the authentication key was stolen, this equality cannot be confirmed Therefore, agent b (on platform
hbi+1) detects a problem on the itinerary. However, it is possible that this platform collaborates with
hai to have agent b believe that this equality is true. Therefore, hai collaborates with hbi+1. Agent b
carries out equality verification at step i+ 1, although the error remains undetected due to manipulation
from the platform on which it is executed, hbi+1. Agent b find that the two equalities are verified
Once on platform hbi+2, the verificatio of the equality prevai+2 = id(hai+1) indicates an error since
platform hai did not send the agent to nextai+1. Unmasking the offender would be problematic since
this equality is not verified Moreover, this corresponds to the case where host ha i+1 sends the agent to
a wrong platform, which would attempt to put it on its track. Figure 8 illustrates this attack scenario.
Indeed, if hai+1 sends agent a to a different platform than nextai+1, and that this platform sends agent
a towards identity platform nextai+1 to put the agent on its track, once on platform hai+2, the equality
previ+2 = id(hai+1) will not be verified because the latter authentically knows the identity of the
platform that sent it to agent a.
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Ffig. 8. Atack wfith colaboratfion betweenhafiandhbfi+1.
Thus, ffindfin a culprfit fis problematfic: we know fit fis possfible that the ofender would behafi, thfis fis
the case we studfied wfithhbfi+1colaboratfion, or fit could be thathafi+1(wfith an accomplfice) trfied to put
the agent on fits track. Agentbverfiffienextafi+1sfignature byhafi+1and compares thfis fidentfity wfith
nextafi. Thfis fis carfied out fin the functfionffindoffender(), whfich fis executed when the agent detects
the atack. If thfis fis a ffirs atack, the fidentfity of the platform that sfignednextafi+1fis dfiferent from both
nextafiand ofenderhafi, wfith the colaboratfion ofhbfi+1. In the case of a second atack, the result fis an
equalfity between these two entfitfies and the ofender fishafi+1.
Another atack wfith colaboratfion betweenhafiandhbfi+1can occur. Platformhafisends agentatoh’,
whose fidentfity fis dfiferent from the host where fit would realy lfike to send agenta. Then, hosth’ would
try to put the agent on fits track by sendfing fit tohafi+1. Once onhafi+1, agentacommunficates wfith agent
bto gfive fitprevafi+1andnextafi+1. Agentbcarfies out fits verfifficatfion and would normaly deduce that
the agent devfiated from fits trajectory sfinceprevafi+1=fid(hafi). However,hbfi+1manfipulates fit fin order
to conffir thfis equalfity.
Although thfis atack fis not fimmedfiately detected, fit wfil be notficed when the agent returns to fits platform
of orfigfin. On stepn, the verfifficatfio of the fitfinerary record wfil establfish thatfid(sfignhafi)=prevafi+1
and ofendershafiandhbfi+1wfil be unmasked. Ifhbfi+1modfiffie the record of entryfi+1, fit wfil be
fincapable of reproducfinghafi+1sfignature. Thus,hbfi+1cannot do so wfithout detectfion upon the agent’s
return as the valfidfity of the sfignatures fis verfiffie on stepn. However, fin thfis case, the fidentfity of the
ofender fis revealed.
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Fig. 9. Attack with collaboration between hai and hbi.
3.3.3. Attack with collaboration between hai and hbj , for j = i and for i > j
Suppose that hai collaborates with hbi so that agent b records hf (where the attacking platform hai
would like to send agent a) as the identity of platform i + 1 visited by agent a instead of h’ (where
a would like to go). Then, agent b records a nextai which is false, and platform hai sends the agent
to the platform that was recorded. In this case, when b will be on platform hbi+1, (that we suppose
to be honest), it will receive the following information from a: nextai+1, prevai+1, id(hai+1). The
verificatio of equality nextai = id(hai+1) is carried out and does not allow immediate detection of
the attack since platform hbi recorded where platform hai sent it (hai+1) rather than agent a’s original
destination (h’). However, this type of fraud will be detected upon the agent’s return to its platform of
origin, since agent b kept the complete itinerary of a and the agent’s owner verifie this itinerary. Figure 9
shows this scenario of attack. This is not a drawback of our protocce this type of fraud is similar to the
case where a malicious platform counterfeits nextai, in the communication between a and b to send
agent a toward another platform than its destination, without b being able to detect the attack. This attack
was called “attack with modificatio of communication between a and b” in Roth’s protocol. The latter
also does not allow for an immediate detection of this attack, although it detects the attack on step n, by
verifying agent a’s itinerary upon agent b’s return. If hai+1 is dishonest, the platform must attempt to
replace the agent on its track. This is detected with hbi+1 since the equality preva + i + 2 = id(hai+1)
will not be verified A collaboration between hai and hbj for i > j prevents an attack. Indeed, agent b
is executed on host hbj before agent a migrated to host hai.
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3.3.4. Atack wfith colaboratfion betweenhafi,hbfi+1andhbfi+2
The prfincfiple of thfis atack fis fidentfical to the atack wfith colaboratfion betweenhafiandhbfi+1:hafi
sends agentatowards a dfiferent platform than fits orfigfinal destfinatfion; once on the platform, agenta
communficates wfith agentbto access the fidentfitfies of the platform, as specfiffie fin the protocol. Ffigure 10
filustrates thfis scenarfio of atack. Usualy,bwould detect the atack, but fin thfis finstance, fit has been
manfipulated by platformhbfi+1that colaborates wfithhafi. Therefore, fit does not detect the atack and
mfigrates towards hosthbfi+2. In the case wherehbfi+2was honest, we would have fimmedfiately detected
the atack and found the ofender. Here,hbfi+2colaborates and manfipulates agentbto have fit belfieve
that equalfityprevafi+2=fid(hafi+1)fis verfiffied In thfis case, the agents’ return to thefir owner’s platform
should be expected. The algorfithm executed upon the return of the agent to thefir owner’s platform (step
n) compares the fidentfity of the platform on agenta’s fitfinerary, who sfigned the entryfi+1wfith nextafi
fidentfity.nextafifis dfiferent from the fidentfity of the platform that sfigned entryfi+1of fitfinerary (hafi+1).
If thfis atack was prevfiously undetected, fit fis due to the colaboratfion betweenhafi,hbfi+1andhbfi+2.As
findficated earlfier, fifhbfi+2fis honest, the platform wfil detect the atack and unmask the ofenders.
3.3.5. Other atacks
Some other atack scenarfios could be fimagfined. However, they wfil finvolve the colaboratfion of several
platforms, and are consequently not addressed fin thfis paper. For example, spooffin agentsa’ andb’ could
be created byhan−1andhbn−1. The afim of these agents would be to revfisfit the fitfinerary and corect fit.
Thfis scenarfio finvolves the colaboratfion ofhan−1,hbn−1,ha1,hb1andhbfi(the platform that modfiffie
the agent’s fitfinerary). The protocol cannot detect the modfifficatfio of agenta’s fitfinerary. Nevertheless,
even fif thfis later could be corected, the results obtafined finsfide the vfisfited platform remafin finvalfid fin the
case where they are sfigned by the platform.
4. Implementatfion and Results
The platform used to fimplement our protocolfis Grasshopper2.2.3,1whfich uses Java as the agent
programmfing language. To cary out the tests, we used 5 machfines runnfing Wfindows 2000. The
machfines are fidentfiffie wfith the name used for the shoppfing applficatfion. The network used fis a local
network, Ethernet 100 Mbps. The mobfile agents are fimplemented usfing JDK 1.3.2The securfity package
IAIK-JCE 3.01 [10] was used; fit ofers a set of dfiferent cryptographfic algorfithms fimplemented fin pure
Java.
It was deemed fimportant to test our protocol fin a relatfively realfistfic envfironment and we decfided to
fimplement an applficatfion where the recordfing and fitfinerary verfifficatfio could help secure the applficatfion.
Our agent shops for a certafin number of products on the user’s behalf. Provfided wfith a descrfiptfion of
the products requfired by the user, fit moves to the platform of many vendors to finqufire about thefir prfices.
In order to sfimplfify the presentatfion, the lfist of products fis supposed to be known by the vendors.
The fitfinerary fis dynamfic: finfitfialy, the user starts the search by enterfing a certafin number of vendor
addresses. However, whfile shoppfing, fif a vendor does not have the lfisted products, the agent fis refered to
another vendor wfith whom trade agreements have been establfished. These agreements contafin ffinancfia
compensatfion clauses for the beneffi of the vendor who routed the agent to another address.
1htp:/www.grasshopper.de/ (July 2003).
2htp:/java.sun.com/j2se/1.3/ (July 2003).
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Fig. 10. Attack with collaboration between hai, hbi+1 and hbi+2.
The mobile agent records the three best offers for each product sought. It could save the entire set
of offers, but if they are too numerous, the result size would become too large. In this case, the agent
could lose some of its advantages over the client-server approach. We chose to save the best three results
instead of a single one, since factors other than prices may influenc the user’s choice (the user could
choose a slightly more expensive product if it came from a more reputed company for instance). The
Grasshopper’s transport service allows for the agents’ transport via SSL (Secure Sockets Layer).
4.1. Implementation tests
First, we tested the agent’s authenticated transport communication. For the client, as well as for the
server, we tested three different cases:
– the client or the server has a signed certificat issued by the certificatio authority,which is considered
trustworthy by the other entity;
– the client or the server has a signed certificat issued by the certificatio authority that is not
considered trustworthy by the other entity;
– the client or the server does not have a certificate
The SSL connection is refused when the client’s or the server’s certificat is not trustworthy. Since the
mutual authentication was forced through our SSL connection, this confirm our assumptions.
Then, we tested the authenticated communication between the two agents. The agent transport is
carried out only if the agent and server have a certificat signed by a trustworthy certificatio authority.
In the other cases, the SSL connection is refused and the message is not sent from agent a to agent b.








Ffig. 11. Experfimental envfironment.
Ffinaly, we tested the detectfion of the atacks on the fitfinerary. We carfied out the atack where platform
hafisends agentato a dfiferent platform than agenta’s orfigfinal destfinatfion. In the same way, we tested
the same atack wfith an atempt to put the agent on fits track. In both cases, the atack was detected durfing
the same stepfi. However, the tests carfied out on the other atacks were lfimfited fin terms of securfity
features to be verfiffied Indeed, atacks where there fis colaboratfion between a host on agenta’s fitfinerary
andahost on agentb’s fitfinerary consfist of manfipulatfing the agents. The purpose of thfis manfipulatfion fis
to modfify the equalfity result or to alter communficatfion between the agents.
We chose to measure the cost of our protocol on a prototypfical mobfile agent applficatfion – the shoppfing
applficatfion descrfibed earlfier. As seen earlfier, the agent departs wfith a shoppfing lfist of three products.
It only knows the address of one vendor, caledsupplfier1. The ffirs vendor sends the agent to another
vendor sfince he does not cary one of the products and has trade agreements that alow forwardfing the
agent to another vendor, caledsupplfier2. Agentahas a lfist of hosts that agentbwfil vfisfit.
Ffive machfines are used to conduct the experfimental study. AGrasshopperplatform fis finstaled on
each machfine. Each platform represents a dfiferent sfite. Two platforms, caledSupplfier1andSupplfier2
constfitute agenta’s fitfinerary. Two other platforms, caledB1andB2constfitute agentb’s fitfinerary. A
ffift platform, caledHome, represents the platform of orfigfin. Consequently, agentsaandbare created
wfithfin theHomeplatform whfich sends agentatoSupplfier1’s platform and agentbtoB1’s platform.
Agentamoves fromSupplfier1toSupplfier2before returnfing toHomeplatform. Agentbmoves from
B1toB2before returnfing to Home platform. Ffigure 11 filustrates thfis experfimental envfironment.
Our tests measured both:
–the executfion tfime for each vendor machfine vfisfited by the shoppfing agent;
–the total executfion tfime for the shoppfing agent and fits cooperatfing agent.
We chose to measure these varfiables as they reflec some of the advantages of the mobfile agent
paradfigm over the clfient-server approach. We measured the executfion tfime wfith the Java method
System.currentTfimeMfilfis(). For the ffirs measurement, we cal thfis method upon the arfival of the agent






























































Fig. 13. Total execution time.
on the platform and before it migrates to the next platform. The second measurement corresponds to
the difference between the time the agents were created and and the moment where agent b finishe the
verification after having returned to its owner’s platform. Hence, this measurement corresponds to the
total time the task required. We did measurements with three types of agents:
– the shopping agent and its cooperating agent, using our itinerary recording protocol;
– the shopping agent and its cooperating agent, using Roth’s protocol;
– only the shopping agent.
Figure 12 shows the execution time for these three situations. It should be noted that there are some
important differences in a given category. For example, measurement 3 of our protocol indicates the
highest results. We noticed (via Grasshopper) that the thread executing the agent used a minimal priority.
The fact that the other threads were executed on the process platform explains the variations in execution
time. Moreover, while the execution time differs little between our protocol and Roth’s (around 7 s in
both cases), it is much lower for the shopping agent. This is explained by the fact that, in both our
protocol and Roth’s, the shopping agent establishes an SSL connection with its cooperating agent, while
this is not required by the shopping agent alone. However, establishing this connection requires time,
since the virtual machine must load many classes in memory and initialize the SSL session.
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Figure 13 shows the total execution time for the three cases. Just as with the execution time on a vendor
platform, although our protocol and Roth’s have similar values, the shopping agent alone requires less
execution time. These results are related to the platform execution time. Note that the total execution
time reflect both the execution time on each platform and the total migration time. Since the network’s
features do not change, the migration time would vary little from one measurement to another. Similarly,
the difference among the migration times of three agents is small, since the agents are of similar sizes
in relation to the network fl w; moreover, in all three cases, we use an SSL connection to transport the
agents.
We also fin a large difference between the relative gap of our protocol and the shopping agent, for
the execution on the vendor’s platform (700%) and the total execution time (70%). As mentioned above,
this is due to the SSL connection which requires much more time.
5. Conclusion
This paper presented a mobile agent itinerary recording protocol. This protocol gives a secure method
of recording the identities of the platforms on which a mobile agent is executed. This problem is difficul
to solve with a single agent since the data transmitted are prone to manipulation by malicious platforms,
which is the reason why Roth [15] introduced the concept of cooperating agents.
We have designed an itinerary recording protocol using the concept of cooperating agents and described
in details the behavior of each of the two cooperating agents, as well as the procedures selected to establish
the identities of the offenders when an attack is detected, as already done by Roth. To show the security
properties of our protocol, we reviewed a set of potential attacks. For each attack, we described the
moment of detection and, when possible, we designated the offenders. Thus, we have been able to
verify that our protocol detects the attack in cases where there is collaboration between a platform on
the cooperating agents’ itinerary and another on the agent’s itinerary. This type of attack is outside the
scope of those addressed by Roth.
Finally, we implemented our protocol and Roth’s on a mobile agent platform. To test these imple-
mentations, we chose a mobile agent shopping application with a random itinerary. This is a classical
application using the mobile agent paradigm where itinerary recording is critical. We tested our protocol
on a set of possible attacks and the results confir our assumption in terms of offender designation and
moment of detection. We compared three implementations (the shopping agent with our protocol, with
Roth’s protocol, and the shopping agent alone) and measured the execution time of the shopping agent
on each platform and the total execution time. Results show that our protocol costs slightly more than
Roth’s in terms of execution time; however, our protocol detects more attacks than Roth’s. The use of
an itinerary recording protocol (either ours or Roth’s) adds a significan cost in terms of execution time
as well as in terms of network load. Thus, our protocol is not suitable in cases where cost is critical.
Future research could strive to create an algorithm that would allow unmasking the offender of a
kidnapped mobile agent: the case in which the cooperating agent’s timer expires. With our protocol, we
know that the kidnapping offender is either the platform from which the agent communicates before the
latter could migrate, or the platform where the agent was meant to be sent the last time it communicated
with the cooperating agent.
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